Diaspora centred development: Current practice, critical commentaries and research priorities by Boyle, Mark & Kitchin, Rob
17S. Sahoo and B.K. Pattanaik (eds.), Global Diasporas and Development: 
Socioeconomic, Cultural, and Policy Perspectives,  
DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-1047-4_2, © Springer India 2014
2.1  Introduction 
 It is somewhat counterintuitive to approach migration as an agent of development in 
sending states. In the past, it was widely believed that emigration was a disadvantage. 
Emigration signalled that the development trajectory being pursued by a country was 
failing and that people needed to relocate elsewhere, perhaps against their wishes, 
to make a living. That emigrants tended to include more able, talented, skilled, and 
self-starting younger people added to the problem, constituting a ‘brain drain’. 
By starving countries of their best talent, the assumption was that sending states 
would face even greater diffi culties in pursuing growth and development. 
 This reading of emigration it seems has now been dismissed as dated. The mantra 
of migration for development has come of age. A seismic shift in thinking and 
practice within the development sector means that emigrants are now seen as 
potentially part of the solution to underdevelopment and not part of the problem. 
Migrants contribute from afar and in a myriad of ways to the betterment of their 
countries of origin. Diasporic communities themselves have often conceived, 
fi nanced, and led schemes and programmes targeted at improving their home-
lands. More recently, sending countries have begun to develop a raft of policies 
designed to court, lever, harness, and tap their overseas communities. And, these 
policies have in turn come to be viewed by the international development community 
as intrinsically virtuous, and international development practitioners have sought 
to promote, undergird, and pedal the idea of diaspora-centred development 
(see Yossi and Barth  2003 ; Lowell and Gerova  2004 ;  Kuznetsov  2006 ; Saxenian 
 2006 ; Vertovec  2007 ; Solimano  2008 ; Faist  2008 ; Dewind and Holdaway  2008 ; 
Bakewell  2009 ; Piper  2009 ; Leblang  2010 ). 
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 Countries which actively harness diaspora in the service of development often 
prepare and are guided by a diaspora strategy. A diaspora strategy is a formal and 
explicit policy initiative or series of policy initiatives enacted normally by a sending 
state, or its peoples, aimed at fortifying and developing relationships with expatriate 
communities, diasporic populations, and foreign constituencies who share a special 
affi nity. Diaspora strategies are most commonly pursued by poor and middle- income 
countries from the global south. Examples include Armenia, India, Mexico, China, 
Chile, Argentina, South Africa, Jamaica, El Salvador, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia, 
Ghana, and Morocco. But more affl uent countries in the global north with large 
diaspora populations are also expressing an interest, including Israel, Scotland, 
Ireland, as well as more developed nations in the south such as Australia, New 
Zealand, South Africa, and Singapore. Whilst the forms of development being 
pursued vary in each case, the essential logic underpinning diaspora engagement 
remains the same: overseas communities have resources and attachments which, if 
harvested properly, have the potential of accelerating economic growth and development 
in the home country (Kutzensov  2006 ;  Levitt and Jawroski  2007 ; Gamlen  2008 ; 
Newland  2010 ; Aikins and White  2011 ; Boyle and Kitchin  2011 ). 
 This chapter provides a review of current practice and refl ects upon some emerging 
areas of critique. Discussion is organized around four principal sections. Sect.  2.2 
will chronicle the motives that have led many countries to approach their diaspora 
as a resource. Sect.  2.3 will then examine the ways in which countries have built 
new domestic institutions to engage diaspora communities and have sought to inter-
vene in different ways. Attention will then turn in Sect.  2.4 to an exploration of six 
areas through which diaspora can make a difference: as donors, investors, knowl-
edge networks, markets, brain circulation, and ambassadors. In each case, exemplar 
diaspora strategy programmes, schemes, and instruments will be identifi ed. 
Unfortunately, to date diaspora-centred development has tended to be promoted, 
celebrated, and embraced rather uncritically. In Sect.  2.5 therefore, six areas of 
emerging critique will be identifi ed and discussed at length. For ease of explication, 
these six realms of critique will bear the titles: the intellectual defi cit, the cottage 
industry, the chosen few, the citizenship challenge, stakeholder disalignment, and 
development for whom. The chapter concludes that if the scholarly community is to 
contribute meaningfully to improvements in the number, scale, equity, inclusivity, 
sustainability, effectiveness, and quality of diaspora for development projects, a 
number of new research competencies will be required. 
2.2  The Turn to Diaspora-Centred Development 
 Why at this historical moment are a growing number of sending countries seeking 
to develop explicit and systematic strategies aimed at creating, managing, and ener-
gizing relationships with their diasporic populations? It is clear that push factors are 
coming from three constituencies: diaspora communities themselves, sending state 
governments, and agencies within destination states. 
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 Now displaying a heightened awareness of their roles and potential, diasporic 
populations are self-organizing and creating a range of new institutional structures 
to deploy their efforts to best effect. The interdisciplinary fi eld of transnational studies 
has revealed the many ways in which migrant communities can impact upon public, 
private, and voluntary institutions in their countries of origin (Appadurai  1997 ; Ong 
 1999 ; Pries  1999 ; Barkan  2003 ; Vertovec  2003 ; Tarrow  2005 ). From hometown 
associations to agricultural cooperatives, from charities to advocacy groups, from 
churches and religions to learned medical and scientifi c academies, from SMEs to 
pension funds, from political parties to national arts and cultural institutions, from 
electoral systems to citizenship laws, from terrorist organizations to peace-keeping 
missions, from satellite TV media to social networking sites, and from university 
alumni projects to technology transfer, it is clear that diasporic communities have 
moulded and are moulding their homelands in ways which we are only now under-
standing. And arguably, they are doing so more refl exively, purposefully, and 
creatively than hitherto. 
 For sending states, interest in engaging diasporic populations normally origi-
nates in trigger events which arise in one of four policy fi elds, of which economic 
development is but one. In addition to development imperatives, sending states are 
being provoked to action on grounds of nation building, citizenship, and demo-
graphic trends. Firstly, whilst historically diasporic groups have played a signifi cant 
role in nation and state building projects in the homeland and historically nations 
and states have looked to diasporic groups to promote their interests overseas, the 
twenty-fi rst century is witnessing a new wave of nation and state building, and as a 
corollary a fresh and novel impetus for new migrant contributions to and on behalf 
of political, social, and cultural causes in the homeland. Secondly, growing interna-
tional migration is challenging the models of citizenship adopted in many sending 
states, leading to a revisiting and clarifi cation of emigrants’ entitlements and obliga-
tions and, in some cases, to the introduction of entirely fresh categories of citizen-
ship. Albeit tempered by fears of geopolitical instability and security concerns, yet 
ever more states are permitting forms of dual and even multiple citizenship. Finally, 
demographic trends, particularly in low birth rate countries, are leading some coun-
tries to engage even more actively in the search for global talent. In the context of 
tensions over the scale of immigrant infl ows, courting the diaspora as a source of 
brain gain has become something of a preferred policy solution to skills shortages. 
 For Ireland, diaspora strategy was initially conceived as an opportunity to spend 
the fi scal surpluses of the Celtic Tiger boom economy (1993–2007) on the protec-
tion and welfare of vulnerable and forgotten overseas migrants, but in the wake of 
the country’s economic meltdown (2007–present), diaspora knowledge networks 
and diaspora tourists are becoming ever more important; for Israel, motivation 
derives principally from the desire to protect and defend the right of the state of 
Israel to exist; for Scotland, concern initially was with low fertility levels and the 
social, economic, political, and cultural consequences of a shrinking population; for 
New Zealand, the diaspora is seen as a means of countering geographical isolation 
from the global economy; for Armenia, the diaspora is being seen as a resource in 
the reassertion and reclamation of a post-Soviet national identity and trajectory; for 
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India and China, diasporic groups are being deployed to broker integration into the 
global economy at a moment when the global distribution of power is being 
realigned; whilst for Mexico, the effi cient harnessing of diasporic remittances is 
being promoted to counter the effects of population fl ight from the global south. 
 It is common for diaspora strategies to broaden out from their point of origin and 
to populate all three policy fi elds. Quite how the point of departure (the specifi c 
policy fi eld and particular triggers) of any diaspora strategy enables and constrains 
the subsequent rolling out of this strategy remains to be understood. 
 Finally, diaspora-centred development is also now being promoted and champi-
oned by a whole raft of agencies and institutions in destination states and in particu-
lar in the global north. In no particular order, these include:
•  The World Bank  ‘Knowledge for Development Programme’ , which has sup-
ported many collaborative policy workshops and exchanges (recent collaborative 
events have been held in Buenos Aires, Santiago, Washington, DC, New York, 
New Delhi, Boston, and Toronto). 
•  IdEA: In May 2011 in the United States, and at the behest of Hilary Clinton, the 
Secretary of State’s Offi ce of the Global Partnership Initiative (GPI), in collabo-
ration with the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), launched the International dias-
pora Engagement Alliance (IdEA) at the fi rst ever Secretary’s Global Diaspora 
Forum. 
•  The MacArthur Foundation , which funded a major research programme titled 
‘Towards a new generation of diaspora strategies’, exploring the role of Diaspora 
in the Development of Institutions in Sending States (focusing mainly upon 
India, Mexico, Russia, and Nigeria). 
•  Diaspora Matters , a not-for-profi t company based in Dublin, Ireland, has pro-
duced a global diaspora strategies toolkit (2011), a new physical and virtual for 
a designed to share best practice in the design and implementation of diaspora 
strategies (live from May 2011). 
•  The  M4D (Migrant for Development) portal is a new joint EU and UNDP 
website designed to share best practice in diaspora engagement. 
•  The IOM and MPI  Roadmap for Engaging Diasporas in Development published 
in 2012 represents a summation of those organizations’ thinking on the topic and 
stands as the defi nitive guide to all stakeholders preparing diaspora-engaging 
programmes. 
•  The Economist ’s special edition in 2012 titled the ‘Magic of Diasporas’ has 
proven a well-cited and quoted document and would appear to be infl uential 
within policy circles. 
2.3  Designing Diaspora Strategies 
 Whilst it is relatively easy to identify branches of state which deal with immi-
gration, it is more diffi cult to establish who governs over matters of emigration. 
Cognate state departments and administrative units, such as prime minister’s 
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offi ces, departments of foreign affairs, home affairs, heritage and culture, education, 
trade, and enterprise and development agencies, devise and implement solutions 
to emigration problems normally in an ad hoc and isolated way. Gamlen ( 2008 ) 
develops the useful notion of the ‘emigration state’ to capture the totality of the 
work these range of state actors perform. 
 A key challenge facing states interested in pursuing diaspora engagement 
policies is how best to use, augment, and develop their existing emigrant state 
apparatus. According to Agunias and Newland ( 2012 ), among the options adopted 
to date include the creation of brand new ministry level diaspora institutions, 
the establishment of hybrid ministries where diaspora engagement is a core brief, 
the introduction of subministry level institutions, the buttressing of consular and 
embassy networks, the erection of new regional or local diaspora engagement 
agencies, and the mobilization of foundations and advisory councils. In turn these 
institutions have sought to scale up the diaspora–homeland relationship, at one end 
of the spectrum by manufacturing fresh new connections and at the other by invigo-
rating existing transnational relations. 
 Within Ireland, the Irish Abroad Unit, a division within the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, seeks to promote joined-up thinking and coordination across 
branches of the state, for instance, with respect to the diasporic relevant work of 
Enterprise Ireland, the Industrial Development Agency, the President’s Offi ce, 
the Department of Education, the Irish tourist authority, and other departments 
within the state. With respect to the policies of these agencies, the motif of the 
Irish state is ‘let a thousand fl owers bloom’, with the state at best ‘lightly incu-
bating’ existing initiatives or seeding new initiatives. The Irish schemes are 
slowly transferring to more managerialist interventions, especially with regard to 
accountability and transparency of spending, but there remains an underlying 
inclination to leave diaspora organizations and networks to run themselves, 
providing only minimal resources (basic funding, advice, speakers, etc.) and 
only when an organization or network needs to be re-energized and requires the 
short-term backing of the Irish state. 
 A key weakness of the Armenian state in the years immediately following inde-
pendence from the Soviet Union was the lack of capacity within the state apparatus. 
Accordingly, across the early 2000s, there has emerged a concerted effort to build 
the Armenian state and undoubtedly the institutional capacity of the current state 
represents a momentous improvement on what the country inherited from the Soviet 
period. The limit of Armenia’s prior weak institutional capacity is especially evident 
when one considers the capacity of the Armenian state to engage, lever, and harness 
diasporic resources and expertise. Part of the challenge of developing a diaspora 
strategy then has been the creation of institutional capacity and structures within 
Armenia capable of extending existing ties and establishing new relationships with 
the diaspora. Initially, this engagement was largely the preserve of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and to an extent, the Ministry for Economy. More recently in 2008, 
a new Ministry of Diaspora was established. This ministry represents a dramatic 
development in state building in the sphere of diaspora engagement, a signifi cant 
ramping up of what Armenia is capable of doing with its diaspora. 
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 India has a well-developed diaspora strategy, which is produced and managed by 
a dedicated Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), which came into existence 
in May 2004 as the Ministry of Non-Resident Indians’ Affairs. Within the terminol-
ogy of the Indian state, this ministry has the status of a ‘services’ ministry. It is primarily 
responsible for all issues relevant to overseas Indians—comprising persons of 
Indian origin (PIOs) and non-resident Indians (NRIs)—which are not specifi cally 
allocated to other ministries/departments of the Government of India. Like Armenia, 
India has found it useful to erect a powerful and central state organ to oversee its ties 
with its diaspora and more specifi cally has adopted a highly interventionist posture, 
setting up schemes and managing programmes directly from New Delhi. 
 The Scottish government’s International Projects Division—instituted by and 
guided by its  International Framework , published in 2008—seeks to promote 
joined-up thinking and coordination across branches of the state, for instance, with 
respect to the diasporic relevant work of Scottish Enterprise, Scottish Development 
International, and VisitScotland. Whilst the International Projects Division performs 
more as nimble and fl exible coordinator than as a key actor itself, and seeks to bring 
a range of agencies behind the plan, the specifi c Scottish schemes tend to be highly 
managerialist in nature. Whilst important exceptions exist, in the Scottish case, the 
state functions largely as the lead player in proposing, managing, and reviewing 
schemes. Indeed, Scotland identifi es itself as Europe’s leading pioneer in the devel-
opment of formal and systematic state-led diaspora strategies. 
 New Zealand’s diaspora strategy is coordinated and managed by  Kea New 
Zealand , a not-for-profi t organization which works in close relation with, but 
which exists independently from, government. As such, the New Zealand state 
operates with a light touch and has externalized diaspora strategizing. Kea was 
conceived and launched at the Knowledge Wave Conference in Auckland in August 
2001. Initially funded through private philanthropy, it is now funded in descending 
order by the government (Ministry of Economic Development and New Zealand 
Trade and Enterprise), the private sector, sponsorship, service fees, and member-
ship fees (both corporate and individual). It has four full-time regional managers in 
the UK (London), Australia (Sydney), North America (New York), and China 
(Shanghai) and 14 international chapters: Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, 
Boston, London, Manchester, Paris, Amsterdam, Dubai, Shanghai, Sydney, Melbourne, 
Brisbane, and Vancouver. 
 China’s approach to its diaspora is being championed by the State Council’s 
General Offi ce of Overseas Chinese Affairs, the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress, and the Political Consultation Conference. Within the Communist 
Party, the Department of the Unifi cation Front assumes primary responsibility. 
Whilst these various institutions promote dialogue with respect to how best to 
engage and cater for the overseas Chinese community, there exists no formal over-
arching diaspora strategy. Undoubtedly the objective of the Chinese authorities is to 
secure the loyalty of the overseas Chinese and to engender a sympathetic pro- 
Beijing, pro-socialist, but still modern and technologically aware diaspora. In spite 
of its centralist reputation, much of what the Chinese state does is mainly designed 
to support initiatives led by diasporic communities and to provide a macro- economic 
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regulatory framework which incentivizes diasporic engagement. And more regional 
diaspora strategies have emerged, nested inside this national framework. 
 What these administrative arrangements (whom within states are charged with 
responsibility and how they exercise this responsibility) reveal is that there is no 
one-size-fi ts-all approach to formulating and implementing a diaspora strategy, nor 
should there be. There are very good reasons as to why countries have adopted 
different approaches, related to the nature and history of their state institutions; the 
scale, nature, timing, and geography of their diaspora; prior and actually existing 
relationships with their diaspora; the capacity of domestic private, public, and com-
munity organizations; and their geopolitical strengths, weaknesses, and challenges. 
Indeed, it is unlikely that any government would succeed in building relationships 
with its diaspora by copying a model pursued by another, though that is not to say 
that they cannot and should not learn from others. The important point is that a 
diaspora strategy need not take the form of, or be best served by, neither (a) a highly 
centralized or highly dispersed set of responsibilities and actors nor (b) a formal-
ized, top-down, bureaucratically regulated, and managerialist blueprint or, on the 
contrary, a bottom-up, grass roots, diaspora-initiated, and anarchic strategy. Rather 
a strategy should be developed in a manner that is sensitive to the context in which 
it will operate and that is most likely to succeed in its aims. 
2.4  Diaspora and Development: Impacts and Projects 
 How do diasporas impact upon the development of sending states from afar? It is 
possible to propose an analytical framework through which the effects of migration 
on development might be apprehended. A total of six categories of impact are iden-
tifi ed. Diaspora can serve as donors, investors, knowledge networks, brain gain, 
markets, and ambassadors. Recognizing these spheres of infl uence, governments 
are beginning to build diaspora strategies, policies, schemes, and programmes to 
capture, enhance, and ramp up positive contributions in each case. 
2.4.1  Diaspora as Donors 
 Migrants can contribute to the welfare of their countries of origin as donors. There 
are at least two dimensions to this phenomenon: remittances and philanthropy. 
 Remittances can be defi ned as private or person-to-person transfers from migrant 
workers to recipients in the worker’s country of origin. In 2010, worldwide remit-
tance fl ows were estimated at $440 billion, $325 billion of which were transfers to 
developing countries (World Bank  2011 ). To compare, recorded remittances to 
developing countries were nearly three times the volume of offi cial development 
assistance (aid), almost equivalent to fl ows of foreign direct investment (FDI), and 
almost four times the amount of private loans and portfolio equity (World Bank  2011 ). 
[AU5]
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The United States remains by far the largest source of outward fl ows, followed by 
Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, the Russian Federation, Germany, and Italy. In 2010, 
India, China, Mexico, the Philippines, and France were the top recipient countries 
(World Bank  2011 ). 
 Currently, sending countries (iconic examples being Mexico and El Salvador) are 
attempting to increase gains from remittances through (a) lowering the cost of trans-
fers and increasing their security; (b) extending transfer services to communities 
which are ‘unbanked’; (c) encouraging collective remittances by providing migrant 
organizations with technical and organizational support, matching funds, marketing 
skills, and other business services; (d) stabilizing exchange rates; (e) encouraging 
more productive uses of remittances; and (f) improving the functioning of the market 
for remittance services. 
 Philanthropy can be defi ned as the private and voluntary donation of resources 
for charitable and public good. In order of numerical importance, philanthropic 
giving is coordinated and promoted by private and voluntary organizations (PVOs), 
religious organizations, corporations, foundations, volunteer citizens, and university 
and college alumni associations (Hudson Institute  2010 ). 
 Johnson ( 2007 ) has drawn attention to diaspora philanthropy as an important 
subset of all philanthropic giving (see also Newland  2010 ). She identifi es two types 
of diaspora philanthropy, which she terms diaspora associations and diaspora foun-
dations. Diaspora associations are organizations run by and for diaspora groupings 
who provide philanthropic support directly and indirectly to their members; the 
most famous example would be the hometown association (HTA) model, especially 
as managed in Mexico. Diaspora foundations are generally established to facilitate 
charitable giving to a specifi c country/region of the world (normally the homeland) 
and include such foundations as the American India Foundation, the Ireland Funds, 
the Atlantic Philanthropy, the Ayala Foundation, the Brazil Foundation, Give to 
Colombia, and Give2Asia. 
 Aikins, Sands, and White (2011 ) claim that the diaspora contribute to philan-
thropy, especially by providing direct gifts of cash, stock, or property; by making 
wills and bequests; by promoting specifi c projects and acting as mentors to them; by 
encouraging governments to create more conducive conditions for giving, particu-
larly in relation to the taxation environment; and by investing in capacity building 
in non-profi t organizations, thereby assisting the non-profi t sector to adopt best 
practice in novel and increasingly important practices such as venture philanthropy, 
social entrepreneurship, and philanthrocapitalism. 
2.4.2  Diaspora as Investors 
 Diasporas can invest in capital markets in countries of origin and can route foreign 
direct investment to their homelands. Diasporic members can fuel capital markets 
(portfolio investment) through holding deposit accounts, securitizing remittance 
fl ows, providing transnational loans, buying diaspora bonds, and supporting diaspora 
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mutual funds (Terrazas  2010a ). Institutions most affected are banking institutions, 
pension funds, insurance companies, and government treasuries. Diasporic members 
can invest in homelands as senior executives in TNCs, venture capitalists, investors, 
and outsourcing contracts to SMEs in countries of origin. 
 China and India are examples of countries which have benefi ted enormously 
from diaspora investment. In China’s case the so-called bamboo networks have 
been of particular importance, investing into the Pearl Delta and other parts of main-
land China from Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia, Canada, and the United States 
in particular. The role of Indian entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley in the transferring of 
technology and the subcontracting of work to Indian companies is also of note. In 
addition, since 1951 Israel has issued bonds specifi cally targeted at, but not restricted 
to, diaspora groupings. Over US$ 1 billion in bonds is issued each year. Moreover, 
established in 1993, Yozma is a scheme designed to create joint venture capital 
funds between the state of Israel and foreign investors, in particular Israeli diaspora 
members. Meanwhile, the Ameria Group, led by Russia-based Armenian billionaire 
Ruben Vardanyan, has invested in Armenia companies and now has assets of over 
US$500million in Armenia. 
2.4.3  Diaspora as Knowledge Networks 
 Diaspora communities can provide soft support to public, private, and community 
organizations in sending states, by enhancing the knowledge base of indigenous 
actors and assisting those actors to procure accelerated global command and 
control capabilities. 
 Much of the recent excitement over the power of diaspora knowledge networks 
has stemmed from Saxenian’s ( 2006 ) pioneering work on ethnic communities in 
Silicon Valley—Chinese, Indian, Taiwanese, Israeli, and more recently Armenian—
who are exploiting their localized social and business webs and tying them into 
homeland public and private initiatives. Serving as brokers or mentors or gatekeepers, 
diasporic communities can provide information and guidance on topics as varied as 
market opportunities, intellectual property rights, upskilling, tax and accountancy 
regimes, labour law, company law, language needs, ICT, and marketing. They can 
also serve as a conduit of technological know-how and a channel of technological 
knowledge transfer. 
 Most diaspora knowledge networks are relatively new, perhaps less than a decade 
old, and rely heavily on internet technologies, especially social networking media. 
Networks vary in their institutional origins (some have grown organically whilst 
others have been manufactured by homeland states), governance and source of 
funding (one or other or all of state, NGO, and privately run and fi nanced), sector 
(some are professional networks which are not sector specifi c; others are targeted 
towards specifi c sectors), and geographical extent (some have regional headquarters 
and chapters in many countries of the world; others are based only in a single country). 
Some countries privilege a single network; others benefi t from the presence of a 
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range of different networks. Examples of the various types and functions of 
networks can be witnessed in GlobalScot (Scotland), ChileGlobal (Chile), Kea New 
Zealand (New Zealand), Advance (Australia), Asia Pacifi c Irish Business Forum 
(Ireland), The Indus Entrepreneurs (India), and ArmenTech (Armenia). 
2.4.4  Diasporas as Markets 
 Diaspora populations can also serve as markets for sending countries, as consumers 
of domestic goods and nostalgia products, and in particular as tourists. 
 Tourism is now the world’s fourth largest industry. Return visits by diasporic 
populations to homelands constitute an unquantifi ed but signifi cant section of this 
lucrative market. According to Agunias and Newland ( 2012 ), diaspora tourism 
includes a broad spectrum of return visits incorporating medical tourism, business- 
related tourism, heritage (or ‘roots’) tourism, exposure or ‘birthright’ tours, educa-
tion tourism, VIP tours, and peak experience tours. The consumption practices of 
diaspora tourists differ from that of all tourists and tend to generate especially high 
levels of demand for often labour-intensive or artisanal products. As a consequence, 
diaspora tourism has the potential to impact particularly favourably on local busi-
nesses and local communities. The tourist sector also provides opportunities for 
diasporic populations to invest in tourism facilities and to open new and perhaps 
less well-known tourist destinations to wider audiences. 
 For Agunias and Newland ( 2010 ), the central policy challenges presented 
by diaspora tourism include providing technical support throughout the value 
chain; easing the fl ow of people and goods across borders (in particular through 
user- friendly visa schemes); supporting research, training, and policy development 
for diaspora tourism, trade, and heritage sites; supporting diaspora-specific 
marketing and branding efforts; and identifying opportunities for high value-added 
trade and tourism investments. Examples of recent high-profi le diaspora tourism 
initiatives include Scotland’s ‘Homecoming Scotland 2009’ event and Ireland’s 
‘The Gathering 2013’. 
2.4.5  Diaspora as Brain Gain 
 Diasporic populations can promote brain gain through permanent and less permanent 
forms of return movements. 
 Programmes designed to encourage brain incubation or circulation remain an 
important part of some countries’ engagement with their diaspora. There exist 
numerous schemes in such countries as Scotland, Ireland, China, Croatia, Thailand, 
Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands to reconnect overseas scientists with home, 
either through return migration or through visiting fellowships. Wang, Zweig, and 
Lin ( 2011 ) provide a profi le of the case of China in particular, a country with an 
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established reverse brain drain strategy. Terrazas ( 2010b ) also provides a useful 
overview of programmes which seek to harness the energy of diasporic volunteers 
even if only for a brief duration. At the supranational scale, the United Nations’ 
Volunteer Programme (UNVP), the International Labour Offi ce’ TOKTEN 
(Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals) initiative, and the 
International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) Migration for Development in 
Africa (MIDA) scheme attempt likewise to fuse the diasporic appetite to volunteer 
with schemes designed to lubricate temporary return. Governments can promote 
volunteering schemes to promote short-term assistance in countries of origin by 
skilled diaspora volunteers and youth diaspora volunteers, especially in relation 
to the support of vulnerable populations, the provision of skills that are in short 
supply, and to assist in the administration of aid, not least following a natural or a 
human- induced disaster. 
2.4.6  Diaspora as Ambassadors 
 Advocates, activists, agitators, and ambassadors within diasporic communities can 
exploit their knowledge, contacts, linguistic skills, and cultural insights to promote 
peace and security in their homelands and to enhance the strategic, diplomatic, and 
foreign policy objectives of their countries of origin. 
 Of course there exists much debate over the extent to which diasporas contrib-
ute more to confl ict and political anarchy in homelands than to confl ict resolution 
and progressive statecraft (Shain and Barth 2003). But Brinkerhoff ( 2009 ) argues 
that it is no longer possible to view diasporas as mere adjuncts to homeland con-
fl icts and provides a valuable summary of the conditions in which diaspora might 
serve as ‘confl ict entrepreneurs’, ‘competing interests’, or ‘contributors to stability 
and development’. 
 Ireland, for instance, has benefi ted from advocacy work conducted by its dias-
pora. Once a contributor to confl ict and an impediment to peaceable relations 
between Britain and Ireland, the Irish diaspora has emerged as a powerful partner 
for peace. In the 1990s, for instance, Irish America worked closely with the Clinton 
administration in the United States and political parties in Northern Ireland to make 
important contributions to the Northern Ireland peace process. Subsequently, it has 
played a role in channelling investment into Belfast, Derry, and border regions to 
buttress peace building. 
 Canada’s role as a global immigrant magnet and leading proponent of multicul-
turalism, and the important subset of Canadians abroad who are naturalized 
Canadians, has provided that country with a fundamentally unique resource. In the 
Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) concept 
of the ‘global citizen’, Canada has an opportunity to harness its diaspora for geopo-
litical ends (The Mosaic Institute and Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation  2011 ). 
The concept of the ‘global citizen’—incorporating as it does all constituencies in 
Canada with resources which might help the country enhance its global activities 
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and relations (including other countries’ diaspora in Canada, whether naturalized or 
not, and Canadian-minded populations overseas, whether Canadian citizens or not 
and whether naturalized or Canadian born)—signifi cantly broadens the populations 
with which diaspora strategies might conceivably engage. 
2.5  Emerging Strands of Critique 
 Undoubtedly, the diaspora for development agenda has proliferated without signifi -
cant critical introspection and commentary. This is not altogether surprising; this 
agenda has enjoyed a certain celebrity status of late and as with many zeitgeist 
concepts, advocates and proponents have displayed certain kind of blind loyalty. 
But suffi cient time has now elapsed and experience garnered to be able to raise a 
number of critical questions that merit further rumination and scrutiny. Here we 
point to six lines of critique which would appear to be emerging as of particular 
concern: the neglected intellectual bases of the agenda, the degree to which an 
unhelpful cottage industry has surfaced around it, the extent to which the concept of 
the diaspora is being mobilized wittingly or unwittingly to include and exclude 
certain communities, the failure to think through how citizenship rules might affect 
and be affected by diaspora-centred development, the extent to which the multiple 
stakeholders involved in diaspora strategies are being aligned, and, fi nally, the 
question of who development benefi ts, where, how, and why. 
2.5.1  The Intellectual Defi cit 
 The diaspora for development agenda would appear to lack fi rm intellectual foun-
dations and roots within both the migration and the development studies litera-
tures. This intellectual defi cit in part derives from the fact that there exists no 
consensus within either the migration or the development studies literature as to 
how contemporary ‘diaspora’ and ‘development’ might best be theorized as sepa-
rate entities let alone together. It also has its origins in the fact that the agenda has 
demanded a conversation between migration experts and scholars of development 
and each constituency has been forced to learn anew an entirely new intellectual 
tradition. This conversation has proven painful and is only in its infancy. The con-
sequence has been the overwhelming tendency to date for research to be policy 
and consultancy oriented. 
 Perhaps,  Larner ( 2007 ) and Gamlen ( 2012 ) have made the greatest progress by 
attempting to study diaspora strategies as instruments of neoliberal economic devel-
opment strategies. To the extent that there is merit in this argument, a political 
discussion then follows. Liberals and neoliberals who view development in terms of 
competition within the global capitalist economy might celebrate diaspora strategies 
as a new source of global competitive advantage. Given that diaspora networks have 
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the potential to broker weaker nations into the global economy, these networks 
might even be said to be contributing to a more equitable and fl atter world. More 
critical accounts, including variants of world systems analyses and dependency 
theory, in contrast might point to the importance of histories of world capitalist 
expansion, colonialism, post-colonialism, and neocolonialism. Diaspora strategies 
might be said to be a distraction, yet another western-centric concept of develop-
ment which is failing to address the root causes of underdevelopment and poverty. 
Indeed, diaspora strategies might be approached as promoting forms of governmentality 
in both the diaspora and the homeland which are designed to discipline and cultivate 
neoliberal subjects. Diaspora strategies inculcate cultural values which are designed 
to support the hegemony of the contemporary global capitalist economy. 
 Others again point to the recent development of third way philosophies of devel-
opment, paying attention to the need to build community capacity and social capital 
in developing nations as an alternative to both free market capitalism and overly 
muscular ‘nanny states’ (Faist  2008 ). Here, the role of diaspora organizations and 
networks might be approached in terms of their capacity to furnish communities 
with forms of cultural, social, economic, and political capital which help them to 
help themselves. Neither the market nor the state can develop societies; only active 
citizens and fortifi ed community capacity can create sustainable development. 
The role of the state is to create conditions in which social capital might prosper and 
diaspora strategizing represents one domain in which the incubation of effective 
social capital is possible. 
 Some suggestive theoretical strands exist therefore. But to what extent can the 
diaspora for development agenda simply be appropriated and rendered intelligible 
within the terms of say existing approaches and their mutants? Alternatively, would 
reading this agenda through the lens of existing theoretical and conceptual tradi-
tions not obfuscate the novelty and originality of the forms of development the 
agenda is promoting? If so, what kinds of new theoretical and conceptual schema 
might be appropriate, and how might these schema contribute to and enrich thinking 
within the fi elds of migration and development studies and practice? 
2.5.2  The Cottage Industry 
 The diaspora for development agenda is an agenda on the rise. Like any idea 
whose time has come, however, it has opened up a ‘career space’ which a number 
of commentators, politicians, business leaders, civil servants, conference organiz-
ers, consultancy fi rms, and academics have been only too glad to fi ll. The conse-
quence is that many constituencies now have a personal stake in the agenda and 
are building biographies which are dependent upon its proliferation. A political 
economy of the very idea of diaspora for development has emerged. A circuit of 
people and ideas has surfaced that has steadily developed into a trade of sorts. 
In such circumstances, there is a danger that hype may triumph over reality and 
disproportionate claims may be pedalled. 
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 Kuznetsov ( 2011 ) builds a case in support of a ‘new generation of diaspora 
initiatives’ which are better equipped to harness diasporic groupings in the building 
of institutions in sending states. Kuznetsov’s desire to rethink and refocus practice 
is rooted in reservations he has concerning the unwarranted pomp, fanfare, and 
associated coterie that appears to be clustering around diaspora strategies. In too 
many cases, ill-defi ned and overly broad diaspora constituencies are being 
engaged; wasteful, unnecessary, and ineffective centralized blueprints and bureau-
cracies are being imposed on an already crowded landscape of purposeful and 
effectual organic transnational relations; and diaspora strategies are becoming 
all-consuming ends in themselves. For Kuznetsov, there is a pressing need to 
adopt a new,  pragmatic approach. Kuznetsov calls for a purposeful reorientation 
of effort, in which diasporic elites are engaged only in so far as these movers and 
shakers can contribute meaningfully to the achievement of specifi c, fi nite, concrete, 
and strategic national objectives. 
 To what extent and in what ways is a political economy of the very idea of diaspora 
for development emerging? Who is pedalling this idea, through what means, and 
towards what ends? Who is benefi ting from the rise of this agenda? How are proponents 
advocating and policing the agenda? Is the current shift of people, resources, effort, 
ideas, and institutions necessary and proportionate given the scale of development 
added endeavour might bring? 
2.5.3  The Chosen Few 
 The concept of diaspora has a long and complex genealogy. Of course for some, the 
idea refers exclusively to the forced migration of those rendered vulnerable or victims 
as a consequence of a natural or human disaster. Much of this historical resonance 
has dissipated. Many diaspora strategies now identify their target audience to 
include all expatriates who have scattered from the home state for a range of reasons 
and/or who feel emotionally connected to their place of origin. But by widening the 
defi nition arguably diaspora strategies have fashioned a concept which is fl exible 
enough to be capable of excluding as well as including certain communities. 
 An asset for a successful diaspora strategy is a loyal and motivated diaspora, 
willing and minded to contribute to national development. To this end, some 
countries promote short-term visits designed to energize future diasporic leaders 
and which will sow the seeds for a lifelong commitment and loyalty. Examples are 
the Taglit-Birthright Israel and MASA programmes, which repatriate Jewish 
youth to Israel, and the Know India Programme. Countries may also provide 
specifi c services relating to cultural identity. For example, India has set up a state-
sponsored genealogy service, ‘Tracing Roots’, which engages a private company 
(Indiroots) to construct a family tree for a small fee. Similarly, the Lithuanian 
government funds Lithuanian schools to teach the Lithuanian language and cultural 
heritage to the descendants of Lithuanian emigrants. Some nations also make use 
of national honours and awards systems to build diasporic loyalty by recognizing 
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the contribution of individual diaspora members to the homeland and to society in 
general. For example, since 2003, the President of India has presented the Pravasi 
Bharatiya Samman (recognition of non-resident Indians)  awards to up to 20 
members of the Indian diaspora, the highest civilian honour which can be bestowed 
on overseas citizens. In 2006, KEA New Zealand started the World Class New 
Zealand Awards to honour New Zealanders who had made signifi cant interna-
tional contribution in different spheres. Some countries have also set up formal 
arrangements of consultation with their diasporas. For example, Jamaica has 
established the Jamaican Diaspora Advisory Board. Its members are elected and 
it meets twice a year to discuss diaspora matters. 
 There is great virtue in schemes such as these. But it could be argued that 
projects designed to build the diaspora are calling to the fore only a narrow group of 
invented or imagined communities. And like all imagined communities of the 
nation, some people may get to be more included than others. Certainly Ho ( 2011 ) 
is of the view that diaspora strategies invent ideas of diaspora and in so doing 
approach, valorize, and incorporate only a subset of overseas migrant communities. 
The risk is that only diaspora elites capable of delivering development for sending 
states will be prioritized. Moreover perhaps only communities who sign up to 
particular narratives of the nation will be appealed to; minority communities, even 
if citizens of a nation, may be overlooked. 
 Might diaspora strategies be said to be creating diaspora communities as much 
as engaging them? Which kinds of communities are diaspora strategies conjuring 
up? Who is included and who is excluded? What are the social, political, cultural, 
and economic costs and consequences of the selective concepts and defi nition to 
diaspora which diaspora strategies are predicated upon. 
2.5.4  The Citizenship Challenge 
 To date, it might be argued that diaspora strategies have paid insuffi cient attention 
to citizenship rules. And yet citizenship rules clearly mediate the extent to which 
diasporic communities are able to contribute to their homelands and in turn are 
shaped by ongoing debates as to the extent to which diasporas can be approached 
both as a resource and as an obligation. 
 The concept of citizenship has a long and fraught history, further complicated 
now by debate as to the legal status and associated rights and obligations sending 
governments might bestow on migrant populations. These rights and obligations 
incorporate civil (legal protection, guarantee of freedoms, security), political 
(voting and political participation), social (social security, education, housing, 
and health services),and economic (work and taxation) spheres. Fox ( 2005 ) and 
Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul ( 2008 ) provide useful overviews of the impli-
cations of large-scale migration for traditional models of citizenship. The concept of 
dual citizenship would seem particularly important today: Dual or multi-citizenship 
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sending country and one or more destination country. In the past decade, there has 
been a proliferation of countries who are now prepared to offer citizenship to 
migrants without requiring them to renounce or annul their citizenship status in 
their countries of origin (see Macklin and Crépeau  2010 ). 
 For sending states, the question of extending citizenship rights to overseas groups 
risks exposing them to unmanageable fi scal pressures (commitments which are 
diffi cult to service), domestic political risks (allowing diasporic groups to shape 
election outcomes or gain access to services without taxation), and diplomatic and 
geopolitical strains (more porous borders, being seen to intervene on behalf of 
citizens in countries where that intervention is not welcome and is likely to breach 
important relations). But it is obvious that any project which seeks to build new 
relationships between sending states and diasporic populations will only be sustain-
able if both groups feel they have a meaningful stake in the project and will enjoy 
mutual benefi ts from ensuring its success. Countries around the world are wrestling 
with the problem of formulating progressive and yet secure, operational, and defen-
sible dual citizenship policies, and few seem to have found a formula that might 
attract the accolade of best practice. 
 How far do diaspora strategies create a new context for the writing and revision 
of citizenship rules? How are diaspora strategies enabled and constrained by existing 
citizenship arrangements? How might existing arrangements be modifi ed so as to 
lubricate the contributions which the diaspora might make without losing sovereign 
control over national borders and exposing countries to undesirable risks? 
2.5.5  Stakeholder Disalignment 
 All too often it is assumed that diaspora strategies need to focus only in building 
relationships between sending states and diaspora populations. This focus is how-
ever too narrow. Diaspora strategies will fail if no effort is made to interact with and 
to engage key stakeholders both within sending states and within destination states. 
 In fact, the role of global diasporas in the development of countries of origin 
is conditioned by (a) the development of an effective diaspora strategy in sending 
states; (b) the scale, history, geography, and dynamics of particular diaspora; (c) a range 
of public, private, and community stakeholders in sending countries; and (d) the 
external aid, trade, diplomatic, security, and immigration priorities of destination 
countries. There exists a unique nexus in each case and it is this unique nexus 
which mediates, energizes, brokers, and frustrates the contributions of diasporic 
groupings to homeland development differently in each case. Diaspora schemes 
which are successful and which are presented as exemplars of best practice are 
often predicated upon a strong collaborative alignment between sending state 
strategies, diaspora aspirations and agendas, and the priorities of destination 
countries. Diaspora schemes which are transferred from pioneers to adopters 
often enjoy more limited success because these adopters display lesser degrees 
of collaborative alignment. Novel diaspora schemes which are piloted in pioneering 
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countries often enjoy limited success because these pioneers display insuffi cient 
prior collaborative alignment to underpin successful implementation. Of course 
degrees of collaborative alignment and disalignment will vary not only between 
diaspora but through time. 
 How far are diaspora strategies paying attention to the wider group of stakeholders 
they need to engage with? Are strategies failing not because they lack merit in their 
own design and resourcing but because they are failing to mobilize the range of 
stakeholders needed to bring success? How might diaspora strategies be made to 
align themselves more clearly with stakeholder groups? 
2.5.6  Development, But for Whom? 
 In part because of the novelty of the diaspora for development agenda, insuffi cient 
attention has been paid thus far to the forms of development which diaspora strategies 
promote. Development is always socially and spatially variable in its impacts and 
there is a need to better understand who benefi ts most, where, why, and how? 
 Notwithstanding aspirational claims and lofty ambitions, it has to be remem-
bered that research into the economic resources and opportunities which sending 
countries might procure from diasporic communities is only in its infancy. In the 
absence of research fi ndings, reliance is often placed upon paradigmatic case studies, 
more often than not selected to promote the virtuosity of fl agship initiatives. Early 
fi ndings, however, point to mixed results. 
 Nielsen and Riddle ( 2007 ) examined why members of diaspora populations 
invest in their homelands. They observed that intra-diaspora cultural differences, 
support for diaspora organizations, and three types of investment expectations—
fi nancial, social, and emotional—were key to understanding migrant motivations. 
Meanwhile Agrawal et al.’s ( 2010 ) study of the impact of emigration from India on 
domestic innovation within Indian companies concludes that innovation rates 
among returning Indian émigrés are no greater than among those who stayed put, 
that knowledge transfer from the Indian diaspora is not suffi cient to offset the losses 
incurred by emigration, that diasporic knowledge transfer has greater benefi ts only 
for high value-added innovations, and therefore that skilled emigration has a gener-
ally harmful effect on the Indian economy. Leblang ( 2010 ) meanwhile provides 
evidence that even after controlling for intervening variables, connections between 
migrants residing in investing countries and their home country do infl uence 
patterns of global investment by reducing both transactional and information costs. 
 There is a certain sense that diaspora strategies work most effectively for the 
existing elites in sending states and may as a consequence simply reproduce and 
intensify existing social and spatial inequalities. The haves most able to engage 
diasporic communities benefi t most whilst the impoverished benefi t least. Those 
communities based in regions with greater levels of development benefi t whilst 
those dwelling in laggard regions fall further behind. Regional polarization widens. 
But this interpretation of the socio-economic footprint of diaspora strategies is at 
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best premature and may in fact be unnecessarily pessimistic. In a whole number of 
ways, and not just with respect to diaspora remittances and philanthropy, the devel-
opment opportunities which diasporic populations bring percolate further and 
deeper into regions, cities, and communities than might be anticipated. In part this 
reach occurs because historically it is the most disadvantaged communities and 
regions which have witnessed the greatest emigration. When these emigrants engage 
with home, it is in part to their specifi c point of origin that they are drawn. 
 What forms of development do diaspora strategies bring? Do these strategies 
merely serve to consolidate existing and ingrained social and spatial inequalities? 
If not why and in what ways might diaspora for development be said to be promot-
ing more socially and spatially inclusive forms of development? Why kinds of 
interventions might contribute to the fortifi cation of more progressive diaspora for 
development programmes? 
2.6  Conclusion: Building Research Capacity for a New 
Generation of Diaspora-Centred Developments 
 It is hoped that in so far as it has offered a status report on where the fi eld is at today, 
and ruminated on important areas of emerging critical commentary, this chapter will 
serve as an introduction to the more detailed papers on specifi c schemes, challenges, 
case studies, countries, and problems which will follow. 
 The diaspora-centred development agenda is important and has great potential. 
It is clearly here to stay. It is incumbent therefore upon the scholarly community to 
conduct research which will assist, develop, improve, and revise the diaspora 
strategies that are now being designed, implemented, and monitored. The research 
community has a role to play in the promotion of a new generation of more sustainable, 
equitable, effective, progressive, and inclusive diaspora for development programmes 
and initiatives. 
 To this end, it is perhaps useful to conclude by drawing attention to the key 
competencies which the research community might need to develop, if it is to play 
a purposeful role into the future. These include:
•  Expanding interdisciplinary literacy: The research community will need to 
develop a more secure intellectual and scholarly foundation for the claim that 
diaspora can positively assist in the development of sending states. This claim 
demands knowledge of a range of disciplinary perspectives. Researchers will 
need to gain a better interdisciplinary knowledge of the problem specifi cally 
with respect to the differing perspectives which exist in the disciplines of 
development studies, international affairs (not least this discipline’s particular 
expertise in comparative studies), and migration studies. 
•  Competency in the fi eld of policy transfer: To date, comparisons and policy 
exchanges have been insuffi ciently refl exive and ideas have circulated opportu-
nistically and on occasions casually, carelessly, and inappropriately. In offering 
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policy prescriptions, researchers need to engage more effectively the large public 
policy literature on policy impact analyses and policy transfer in political 
science. Such engagement will improve the quality of the advocacy of particular 
models as best practice. 
•  Methodological competency in new cultural settings: There is a need to establish 
a wider set of methodological competencies. It is imperative that comparative 
research, and in particular fi eld research, is undertaken in a wide range of chal-
lenging development and cultural environments, in Europe, in Central and South 
America, Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Oceania. For instance, researchers 
need to upskill in conducting online surveys in cross-cultural contexts. 
•  Research management skills and consortium building : The scale and breadth of 
the research programmes that are required surpasses that which are routinely 
launched between research institutes. Exposure to high-level project manage-
ment skills will be required to breed a new generation of PI s for large research 
programmes. Researchers will need to develop and extend international research 
networks and will need to establish a deeper presence in globally signifi cant 
academic and policy networks. 
•  Developing outreach skills and reach multiple publics : The research commu-
nity needs to sharpen its skill set regarding creating and disseminating applied 
and publicly useful knowledge to a wider range of actors beyond the academy. 
A new generation of public intellectuals with expertise in diaspora and devel-
opment is needed. 
•  Capacity to educate both the general student body (as good citizens) and future 
leaders in the NGO/development sector : Research-led teaching should introduce 
new graduate-level masters and PhD students—and, crucially, external partners 
who wish to attend CPD classes—to the fi elds of migration and development. 
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